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3 Criminal Law Brief
HAVE WE ABANDONED THE INNOCENT? 
SOCIETY’S DEBT TO THE WRONGLY CONVICTED
Meggan Smith*
In July of 1996, Vincent Moto was released from a
Pennsylvania prison after serving ten and one half years for
rape and robbery.1 After his release, Moto returned to his
hometown of Philadelphia and moved in with his parents.2
While he was in prison, his parents raised his three children,
who were by that time eleven, fifteen, and sixteen years old.3
Moto’s youngest daughter was born about a year after his
release; he now has sole custody of her, and is raising her in his
parents’ house.4
Although Moto earned a degree in business manage-
ment, he has struggled to find adequate employment because of
his criminal record.5 Since the time of his release he has had
various jobs as a skilled laborer and a salesman,6 but at times he
supported himself and his family on welfare and food stamps.7
Seven years after his release, he was still seeing a therapist to
deal with the frustration of not being able to support his chil-
dren and parents on low-paying jobs or public assistance.8
Almost ten years after his release, he is unemployed, has no
health insurance, and still lives in his parents’ home.9
If Moto had been released on parole, he would have
had access to job training and placement assistance, counseling
services, housing assistance, and other social service programs
provided by the state.10 Instead, he had to find his own job,
obtain the services of a therapist, and live with his parents for
years after his release.11 So why did Moto not receive the assis-
tance offered to parolees?  Why was he left to fend for himself
without any guidance from the state?  The answer is quite sim-
ple – Moto was innocent.12
Moto spent ten and one half years in prison for a crime
DNA later proved he did not commit.13 A decade after his
release, he has received no apology from the state of
Pennsylvania and no compensation for the time he served.14
Although he has continued his education, his search for a well-
paying job is hampered because his wrongful conviction still
appears on his record.15 Moto continues to deal with the psy-
chological effects of being imprisoned.  He fights the feelings
of inadequacy from not being able to support his children and
his parents, and the disillusionment caused by the system’s fail-
ure to compensate him.16
Moto is not alone among exonerees.17 Rather, his
story is representative of the experiences of men and women
released from prison after proving their innocence.18 In a study
of sixty exonerees by the Life After Exoneration Program,
forty-eight percent were living with family members, forty-six
percent were not financially independent, thirty percent had lost
custody of their children because of their incarceration, twenty-
eight percent suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
and forty percent suffered from depression.19 Additionally,
nearly half of exonerees earn less after their release than they
did before their arrest.20
With the increasing number of exonerations in recent
years21 and the growing awareness of the problems exonerees
experience when they are released,22 states must confront the
issue of how they will compensate these individuals.  As the
calls for a more re-integrative parole system become more fre-
quent, it seems unconscionable that we currently do less for
those whom we incarcerated wrongly than those we properly
convicted and imprisoned.23 In an effort to assist the debate
over compensation for exonerees, I will examine the legal and
social circumstances they face upon their release, compare
these circumstances to those confronted by parolees, survey the
various ways society and the legal system currently assist
exonerees, and analyze how the current approaches fail to sat-
isfy society’s debt to the wrongly convicted.  In order to com-
pensate exonerees, states must pass comprehensive legislation
providing monetary compensation and access to social services
and must address the underlying causes of wrongful convic-
tions.  Until such reforms are made, society will continue to
compound the grievous injuries it has already inflicted on
exonerees.
With the recent “innocence movement” it has become
clear that our criminal justice system produces wrongful con-
victions.24 There are now nearly 400 men and women in the
United States who were released from prison because evidence
strongly supported their innocence.25 The number of exonera-
tions per year has grown steadily since 2000, rising from an
average of twelve per year through the early 1990s to an aver-
age of forty-three per year between 2000 and 2004.26 Because
the causes of wrongful convictions and proposed solutions have
been thoroughly discussed elsewhere,27 I will give only a brief
overview of the issue.  
While the possibility of convicting innocent people
was recognized long ago, the advent of DNA testing revealed
just how often that possibility becomes a reality.28 As newspa-
per headlines about wrongful convictions became more and
more common, similarities between the exonerees’ cases
became apparent.29 Several factors emerged as the most likely
to result in a wrongful conviction: mistaken eyewitness or vic-
tim testimony,30 police or prosecutorial misconduct,31 mistaken
or fabricated scientific evidence,32 jailhouse snitch testimony,33
and ineffective and/or under-funded defense counsel.34
During the early years of the innocence movement, the
efforts to exonerate those wrongly convicted were centered in
Northwestern’s Center on Wrongful Convictions35 and The
Innocence Project at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.36
Currently, there are more than thirty “innocence projects” oper-
ating in more than forty states.37 Although many of these
organizations, like The Innocence Project, concentrate solely on
DNA exonerations, others work on all cases of possible wrong-
ful conviction.38
While the movement was in its early stages, few
stopped to consider what would happen to exonerees after they
were released.  Activists were often overwhelmed by the battle
to simply get the wrongly convicted exonerated and released 
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from prison; thus, it was only after the movement had succeed-
ed in a number of cases that they recognized the need to address
the exonerees’ reentry into society.39 As Peter Neufeld, co-
founder of The Innocence Project, observed, “We were getting
all these people out of prison, but we found most of them were
having tremendous difficulty with life on the street.”40 It
became apparent that exonerees were not prepared for the tran-
sition from prison into the public.41
Spotlight
In order to appreciate the circumstances that exonerees
confront, it is useful to examine a few of their stories in depth.
Michael Green was released on October 9, 2001, after serving
thirteen years for a rape he did not commit.42 At the time of his
arrest, he had just quit a job in maintenance at the Cleveland
Clinic Center Hotel.  He was a sixth-grade
dropout with a history of drinking, stealing, and
street fighting, but he had not previously been
arrested.  When he was convicted of raping a
Cleveland Clinic cancer patient at the Hotel, he
was shocked and angry.43
With the guidance of Arthur Freeman,
a fellow inmate, Green was able to overcome
this anger and really turn his life around.  He
converted to Islam, learned to read, and earned
his G.E.D.  As Green improved himself in order
to fight for his freedom, his mother repeatedly
told her new husband, Robert Mandell, that her
son was innocent.  While he was initially skep-
tical, after regularly talking to Green on the phone, Mandell
began to believe in his stepson’s innocence.  When Green told
him about The Innocence Project, he decided to put his training
as a paralegal to good use.  Mandell took money from his retire-
ment account to fund his efforts to free Green.  After an often
frustrating search, Mandell located the washcloth that would
eventually exonerate Green.  The rapist had used the washcloth
to wipe himself off after the attack.  The DNA in the semen on
the washcloth was not Green’s.44
The day Green was released, he was greeted by anx-
ious reporters outside the prison.45 Green answered the
reporters’ numerous questions, and then went to his parents’
house where his family greeted him to celebrate his homecom-
ing.  After the extended family members left, Mandell suggest-
ed he take a walk around the neighborhood, but Green could not
bring himself to leave the yard.  He did not have a single piece
of identification and feared that cops would stop him on the
street.46
Because he felt overly-dependent on his parents, who
had already done so much to help him, Green immediately
began looking for employment.  Although he was officially
exonerated by Cuyahoga County Judge Anthony Calabrese, Jr.
on October 18, 2001, employers were wary of hiring him.  His
sister arranged an interview at her place of employment, but
they would not hire anyone who had served time in prison,
regardless of their innocence.47 Determined to begin paying his
mother and stepfather back, Green settled for a job at
McDonald’s.48
It was not until the following June that Green found a
job he really wanted.  Rakin Abdul Aziz, a former fellow
inmate, worked at a community reentry program for juvenile
offenders.  Because Green wanted to work with adolescents to
try to put them on the right path, he accepted a maintenance
position at the youth apartments of the reentry program.  For the
first time, Green had medical benefits, sick leave, and paid
vacations.49
Although Green eventually found satisfactory employ-
ment, his relationships with family members were still strained.
Many family members thought he was arrogant now that he was
educated.50 His parents worried when he moved in with
Patricia Everson, a childhood friend of his sister.  They thought
she was only after the possible settlement in Green’s lawsuit
against the city.  Green did eventually settle his suit against the
city of Cleveland and the state of Ohio.  He received almost $1
million from Ohio and $1.6 million from Cleveland.51
William Gregory spent seven years in prison for rape
and attempted rape before being released in
2000 when DNA testing exonerated him.52
Gregory’s story reveals how important assis-
tance other than monetary compensation can be
to an exoneree’s reentry into society.53 Before
his arrest, Gregory worked fulltime as an elec-
tronics salesman at Sears and was sixteen hours
away from an associate’s degree at a communi-
ty college in Louisville, Kentucky.  In 1993, he
was convicted of the rape and attempted rape of
two women who lived in his apartment com-
plex.  After reading an article about The
Innocence Project, Gregory contacted them
about testing hairs found in the stocking that the
rapist used as a mask.  After DNA testing excluded Gregory as
the source of the hairs, he was released on July 6, 2000.  
While Gregory received no assistance from the gov-
ernment, he was overwhelmed by the response of the public.
He had no family in Louisville, so initially his supporters
arranged for him to stay in a halfway house for parolees run by
a church organization.  Just like the parolees, Gregory had to
ask for permission whenever he left the halfway house and was
patted down for weapons and given a breath test for alcohol
whenever he returned.54 However, after hearing his story in the
media, the public quickly responded to his needs.  A local real
estate agent provided him with an apartment, rent-free, where
he lived for over a year.55 A woman who wished to remain
anonymous furnished the apartment and provided Gregory with
food and clothing.56 A case manager with a local non-profit
job-training agency signed him up for a cell phone on her own
phone plan and offered to help him sort through the numerous
job offers he received from employers who had heard his
story.57
Although the tremendous support Gregory received
from the public gave him an emotional lift, it did not solve
many of the practical obstacles he confronted upon his release.
The numerous job offers he received were all entry-level sales
positions that paid less than what he earned at Sears before his
arrest.  His initial efforts to find better employment were frus-
trated because his conviction still appeared on his record.  By
the time his record was expunged he had settled for returning to
his position at Sears.  
As an additional obstacle, Gregory owed over $25,000 
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in child support from the time he spent in prison.58 His son,
who was eleven at the time of Gregory’s exoneration, lived in
Illinois with his mother.  After his release, Gregory resumed his
support payments but felt he should not be responsible for the
support from the time he was in prison.  More than a year later,
the Family Court judge presiding over the child-support case
agreed with him and dismissed the case.  Although his son has
moved back to Kentucky, Gregory rarely sees him.  His son,
who is now seventeen, has been in trouble with the police for
drugs and resents Gregory for not being around when he grew
up.  
Now, almost six years after his release, Gregory still
feels the effects of his imprisonment.  His fiancée ended their
relationship because she could no longer deal with the psycho-
logical after-effects Gregory experiences from being incarcer-
ated.  He completed his associate’s degree, but still struggles to
make ends meet.  He has changed jobs frequently, looking for
better pay, and at times worked two jobs.  He is currently a
manager at Best Buy, earning $11 an hour.  Gregory did receive
good news recently when a federal appeals court reversed the
dismissal of his lawsuit against the Louisville police depart-
ment.59 He now must prove his claim of false arrest and
imprisonment to receive compensation from the government
for his wrongful conviction.   
Unlike Michael Green and William Gregory, Kevin
Green received compensation through a special bill passed by
the California legislature.60 Kevin Green served sixteen years
for the second-degree murder of his unborn daughter and the
attempted murder of his wife.  Before his arrest, Green was
serving in the Marine Corps.  During the time Green was in
prison, his daughter from his previous marriage grew up with-
out him, three of his grandparents died, and his family in
Missouri spent tens of thousands of dollars on lawyers and vis-
its to prison and took out a third mortgage on their house.61
Green was released on June 20, 1996 after the California
Department of Justice matched DNA evidence from the scene
of the attack on his wife to another man through a DNA data-
base.62
After his release, Green moved to Utah to be with the
woman he married while he was in prison.  He got a job call-
ing bingo for $6 an hour, six nights a week.  After about a year,
Green and his wife moved to Missouri to be closer to his fam-
ily, but not long after, his wife left him and they divorced.
Green got a job at WalMart.  He started out making $6.15 an
hour, but quickly moved up to $7.50 an hour.  
Seven dollars and fifty cents an hour was not enough
to solve Green’s financial problems.  While he was in prison,
his second wife, the victim of the attack who had been left with
serious injuries, obtained a default judgment against him for $6
million.  Even after Green’s release, his second wife and her
family pursued the judgment against him.  His wife had mistak-
enly identified Green as her attacker and still refuses to believe
that he is innocent.  More than three years passed after Green’s
release before a judge vacated the judgment against him.  
It was nearly two years after his release before his
lawyer discovered a rarely-used California statute for compen-
sating the wrongly convicted.  The statute capped damages at
$10,000.  Green received the maximum amount in November
of 1998.  In reviewing Green’s case, however, the California
legislature decided that $10,000 was simply not enough to
compensate someone for sixteen years in prison.  On October
5, 1999, California’s governor signed a bill authorizing the
state to pay Green $620,000 in compensation.   Green’s attor-
ney received approximately one third of the award.  From the
money remaining, Green voluntarily gave $50,000 to his sec-
ond wife to help cover her continuing expenses, repaid his par-
ents some of the money they had spent for his legal defense,
and invested more than $200,000.63 Unfortunately, Green sim-
ply did not know how to manage investments.  Combining his
lack of money-management skills with the downturn in the
stock market in 2000-2001, Green ended up with around
$60,000 of his original investment.  
Legal and Social Circumstances Confronted
by Exonerees
As the above stories demonstrate, exonerees’ strug-
gles are not over once they are released from prison.  Instead,
they immediately confront obstacles, including financial diffi-
culties, trouble finding adequate employment, the psychologi-
cal effects of imprisonment, and changes in their family and
community.  However, these barriers are not unique to
exonerees; parolees face many of the same difficulties when
they are released.  While the psychological effects on
exonerees are somewhat different, parolees too face financial
hardship, unemployment, the possibility of homelessness, and
the need to adjust to changes in society.64
Two factors distinguish exonerees from parolees.
First, the government provides parolees with a parole officer
and various services to smooth the transition from prison back
into the community.65 Exonerees are simply released back into
the world with little, if any, guidance.  They do not have access
to the job training, job placement services, housing assistance,
educational assistance, or mental health services that are often
available to parolees.66 Second, society rightly feels a stronger
sense of moral obligation to exonerees than parolees.  While
the government may feel some sense of moral responsibility for
the plight of parolees, that is not the usual justification for pro-
viding them with services.  Rather, society is willing to provide
such services because of a belief that public safety is enhanced
by successfully reintegrating parolees into the community.67
These two factors seem incompatible.  It would be
reasonable to expect that, because of society’s heightened sense
of moral responsibility toward exonerees, they would have
access to the same assistance, if not more, than parolees
receive.  However, while both academics and officials within
the criminal justice system have been calling for a more re-inte-
grative, community-centered approach to parole,68 the debate
about what society owes exonerees has only just begun.  To
adequately understand that debate, it is necessary to more fully
explore the obstacles exonerees confront upon release.    
Exonerees’ most immediate concern is having a roof
over their head.  One survey revealed that forty percent of
exonerees lack adequate housing.69 Most exonerees initially
live with family members or friends,70 but as Gregory’s story
shows, some depend on generous members of the community.
Although the prospect of obtaining their own housing depends
heavily on their ability to find adequate employment,
exonerees face more than financial barriers to moving out on
their own.  They are not eligible for the housing assistance
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provided to parolees and their conviction, if it has not been
expunged or vacated, may bar them from public housing assis-
tance.71 Additionally, landlords may be reluctant to rent to
them because they have little or no credit history and a crimi-
nal record.72 Some exonerees suffer psychologically from their
reliance on others for such basic needs.  After surviving incar-
ceration, exonerees do not want to be dependent on others.73
One exoneree, Clyde Charles, after living with his sister for
three years without finding employment, began living in his car
to feel more independent.74
In addition to adequate housing, exonerees need
employment.  In a survey, exonerees identified this as their
most immediate concern.75 As the director of the Life After
Exoneration Program observed, “These are pretty macho guys.
They don’t want to go right into counseling.  What they want is
to go back to work.”76 Their need for employment is even
more urgent because they and their family have usually
exhausted their assets in the legal battle to prove their inno-
cence.77 Moto’s parents, who paid his legal
expenses with their retirement fund, had to
return to work after his release in order to sup-
port themselves.78 Such financial concerns are
exacerbated by the fact that exonerees have a
large gap in their credit history, if they had
even built up any credit before their incarcera-
tion.79
While many exonerees, like Gregory,
are offered jobs from people who hear their
story or are able to find employment through
family connections, the jobs are usually low-
paying, with little prospect for advancement.80
Exonerees often take such jobs because they
feel an obligation to repay those who helped them while they
were in prison.  As one exoneree explained, “I’m a burden on
my family.  I’ll do anything that pays bills and puts food on the
table.”81
Exonerees confront several problems in their search
for employment.  First, many exonerees’ convictions have not
been expunged or vacated, so they still technically have a crim-
inal record.82 In order to convince potential employers of their
innocence, exonerees often carry various forms of documenta-
tion of their release.  Gregory carried around legal paperwork
that confirmed his exoneration,83 Michael Green had a letter
from the judge who officially exonerated him,84 Anthony
Robinson carried a faxed copy of his pardon,85 and Eduardo
Velazquez had a newspaper article from the day of his
release.86
Even with such documentation, some employers will
not employ people who have served time in prison, regardless
of their innocence.87 There is a stigma attached to having
served time in prison and many exonerees find that employers
are wary of hiring them and coworkers are reluctant to work
with them.  Kirk Bloodsworth, who was wrongly convicted of
raping and killing a young girl, was driven away from a job
when coworkers began leaving clipped newspaper articles
about the killing at his workstation.88 Even exonerees, like
Moto, who have furthered their education after their release
have difficulty finding employment commensurate with that
education.89
Additionally, exonerees often have limited or obsolete
job skills when they are released.  They usually entered prison
when they were young, before they had an opportunity to
develop marketable skills.90 Many had little education and,
because of the elimination of many prison education pro-
grams,91 did not receive further education while incarcerated.
As one exoneree said, “Coming out, it’s like you’re an 18 or 19
year old again.”92 Even those who had decent employment
before their conviction often find that their skills are no longer
adequate for the job market they reenter.  Many have never sent
an email or even used a computer.93 Gregory, who was an elec-
tronics salesman before his conviction, had to catch up on
seven years of technological advancement when he returned to
that position upon his release.94
Intertwined with exonerees’ problems finding ade-
quate housing and employment are the psychological effects of
incarceration and of the transition back into society.  Exonerees
emerge into a world very different from the one they left.  They
are often overwhelmed by changes that most
people take for granted.  Most have never used
a cell phone, a computer, or the Internet.
Gregory remembers the confusion he felt the
first time he tried to use a gas pump with a
credit card machine and a self-checkout lane at
the grocery store.95 Ronnie Bullock com-
ments, “Everything was a lot faster than it was
when I went in.  Pagers, cell phones, cam-
corders – even going to the grocery store was
different.”96
In addition to the changes in the
world, exonerees must adjust to changes in
their family and friends.  Many lost family
members while they were incarcerated.97 Calvin Washington
did not even find out about his mother’s death until he was
released, after she had been deceased for two years.98
Exonerees, like Gregory and Moto, often lost contact with their
children while they were incarcerated and have difficulty estab-
lishing a parent-child relationship once they are released.99 For
exonerees who were convicted of murdering a family member
or friend, the adjustment can be even more difficult.  Beverly
Monroe, who was convicted of murdering her boyfriend, says,
“I lost the person that I loved . . . and I’ve never really had a
chance to grieve, or even be sad.”100 Exonerees like Monroe
never had the chance to mourn the loss of the murder victim at
the time of the murder or during the struggle to exonerate them-
selves, so they have to confront that when they are released.101
The exonerees are not the only ones who struggle to
adjust to changes.102 Exonerees’ family and friends often have
trouble accepting the changes in them.   As psychologist John
Wilson explained, “The person they knew who went to prison
no longer exists.  In a very real sense, that person has died psy-
chologically.”103 Some of Michael Green’s family members,
expecting the thuggish, street-fighting Michael they once knew
to come home, were surprised when he returned highly reli-
gious and well-educated.104 Both the exoneree and the family
must relearn how to interact with one another.  
More fundamental than the changes in their communi-
ty and family, exonerees must deal with the psychological
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tion.  Exonerees, like many former inmates, experience sleep
disorders, paranoia, anxiety, depression, and PTSD.105 They
also suffer from institutionalization.106 The years of strictly
regimented and controlled behavior strip inmates of their
agency.  Dr. Terry Kupers, who has worked with exonerees and
former inmates, says, “They are unable to think for themselves
and interact spontaneously and naturally with the nonprison
world.”107 David Pope, an exoneree, observed, “All your food
is cooked for you, all your laundry’s done; you’re being taken
care of.  Over a period of years, you just don’t realize it.  All of
a sudden when you get out you have to do all these things for
yourself.”108 The effects of institutionalization are often felt
more strongly by exonerees than by parolees simply because
exonerees are not provided with any tools to cope with the tran-
sition from strict regimentation to freedom.109 Also, like most
former inmates, exonerees experience relationship difficulties.
As a result of the sexually violent atmosphere of prisons, for-
mer inmates often experience a decreased sex drive or sexual
dysfunction after they are released.110 Compounding such
problems, dating customs have often changed during their
incarceration.111
While the above emotional difficulties are experi-
enced by former inmates as well, exonerees do experience
unique psychological problems.  As a result of their wrongful
conviction, they often feel an intense paranoia that they could
be wrongly accused again at any moment.112 Many exonerees
go out of their way to avoid certain people and situations.
Larry Youngblood, convicted of child molestation, avoids situ-
ations where children may be around.113 Ken Wyniemko, con-
victed of rape, said, “If a woman walks up to me that I don’t
know, I keep my distance, because in the back of my mind, I’m
worried that she’s going to accuse me of molesting her.”114
Others take extreme measures to ensure that they can
always account for their whereabouts.  Anthony Robinson
described his behavior: “I would chronicle where I went.  I
would write down what bus I got on, any distinguishing fea-
tures about the driver, the time, where I got off, what was going
on at that time – all kinds of little extraneous facts . . . For three
or four years, I did that almost religiously.”115 David Quindt
was so paranoid about being arrested again that when the police
officer who had arrested him showed up at the Jiffy Lube where
he worked, he fled and never returned.116
Once the difficulties exonerees face are more fully
understood, society must answer the question of how it will
respond to their predicament.  At the present time, efforts to
address exonerees’ problems are just beginning to emerge.  A
comprehensive solution that provides a holistic system to com-
pensate them for the time spent in prison and to re-integrate
them into society remains elusive.  To develop such a system,
current methods of compensation must be studied to ascertain
where the existing solutions are lacking.  
Why Should Exonerees be Compensated?
Before examining current compensation systems, we
must first address the question of why society should provide
monetary compensation to exonerees.  There are several justi-
fications for providing compensation.  First, and most obvious-
ly, society is morally responsible for wrongful convictions and
should recognize that responsibility.  As discussed below,
claims that various government actors are legally at fault for a
wrongful conviction are difficult to prove. However, the gov-
ernment is unquestionably morally culpable for what exonerees
have endured.  In addition, a compensation system would moti-
vate the government to protect against wrongful convictions by
shifting the costs of mistakes from the individual exonerees to
the government.117 Compensation statutes also provide a form
of social insurance to spread the costs associated with wrong-
ful convictions.118
Opponents of compensation statutes claim that there is
no reliable way of separating the truly innocent from those
against whom the state simply no longer has enough admissi-
ble evidence to retry.  Although this objection was a powerful
one before the advent of DNA technology, it carries significant-
ly less weight now.  Exonerations through DNA evidence show
more than possible or probable innocence; they show actual
innocence.  The actors within the system have been slow to
acknowledge this difference.  As Pete Adams, executive direc-
tor of Louisiana District Attorneys’ Association, said, in oppos-
ing a compensation bill in Louisiana, “The danger in awarding
state compensation for freed inmates is that there is no logical
line to draw between factually innocent cases and the [legally
innocent cases].”119 Prosecutors, witnesses, police officers,
and victims often continue believing in exonerees’ guilt even
when most outside observers agree that they are actually inno-
cent.120 In the case of Calvin Willis, the prosecutor and two
eyewitnesses remain convinced Willis is guilty even though
DNA exonerated him.121 Josiah Sutton’s application for statu-
tory compensation was delayed when the Houston prosecutor
refused to provide the statutorily required letter affirming
Sutton’s innocence.  The prosecutor explained his refusal by
saying, “If I knew he was innocent, I would [write the letter].
But I don’t know that now . . ..  If you give me some good rea-
son to believe [the victim] was mistaken, I will probably send
the letter.”122
Responding to such objections, one scholar has analo-
gized statutory compensation for exonerees to crime victim
compensation legislation, which now exists in every state.123
Just as states have no legal obligation to compensate exonerees,
they have no such obligation to compensate innocent victims of
crime.  Rather, states recognized that they have a moral obliga-
tion to those they failed to protect from criminals.124 The
state’s moral obligation to exonerees is even stronger because
they were injured not by private criminal action, but by the
operation of the criminal justice system, a central government
function. 
Not only is the state’s moral obligation to exonerees
stronger than that to crime victims, implementing a wrongful
conviction compensation system would be no more demanding
than a victim compensation system.  Just as states have devel-
oped procedures for screening out victims who somehow con-
tributed to their victimization,125 by, for example, participating
in criminal activity, states are equally capable of screening
exonerees’ claims to ensure that only the factually innocent are
compensated.  Many states have set up a separate administra-
tive body to consider victim compensation claims, however
because there are far fewer exonerees than innocent crime vic-
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IV. How Does Society Currently Address the Needs of
Exonerees
tims, wrongful conviction claims can easily be dealt with
through the existing state judiciaries.126 With the political will
to do so, states are perfectly able to draft a wrongful conviction
compensation statute that adequately compensates exonerees
and protects against claims without merit.  
Existing Systems for Monetary Compensation
Even including exonerees in states with compensation
statutes, most exonerees receive no compensation.  According
to the highest estimate, thirty-seven percent of exonerees
receive compensation from civil lawsuits, private legislation,
or compensation statutes.127 One survey found that only sev-
enteen of 160 inmates freed based on DNA evidence between
1989 and 2005 received compensation.128 For those exonerees
who are compensated, the time and effort involved strongly
depends on whether their state has a compensation statute.  
Exonerees convicted in states that do not have a
statute must resort to one of two options: a civil lawsuit or spe-
cial legislation.  When applied to the situation of wrongful con-
victions, both avenues are riddled with obstacles.  The most
difficult thing to overcome when pursuing a civil lawsuit, apart
from the length and expense of civil litigation in general, is the
fact that, with the majority of wrongful convictions, no one is
legally “at fault.”  When pursuing civil litigation, exonerees
must resort to the inadequate avenues of a malicious prosecu-
tion, false imprisonment, or false arrest claims against the
police department, individual police officers, state forensic
analysts, and/or prosecutors involved with their conviction.129
To prove malicious prosecution, claimants must show
that the proceedings eventually terminated in their favor, that
there was not probable cause for their arrest, and that they were
prosecuted with actual malice.130 False imprisonment involves
the knowing and intentional confinement of a person against
their will and without privilege.131 A claim for either malicious
prosecution or false imprisonment, therefore, can be defeated
by showing probable cause for the claimant’s arrest, a standard
easily met even in wrongful conviction cases.132 Exonerees
may also bring a claim of false arrest in violation of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. §1983, but this
claim is also defeated by a showing of probable cause.133
A few exonerees have brought malpractice claims
against their defense attorneys, but because malpractice stan-
dards incorporate the Sixth Amendment standard for ineffec-
tiveness,134 such claims are equally difficult to sustain.135 One
such claim has met with limited success.  John Dixon sued the
New Jersey Office of the Public Defender, claiming their rep-
resentation was ineffective because they ignored his repeated
requests for DNA testing before advising him to plead guilty.136
An Essex County judge denied the public defenders’ motion
for summary judgment.  
Even when an exoneree can prove the necessary ele-
ments of such claims, he will face additional obstacles.
Witnesses, police officers, prosecutors, and judges, the most
common defendants in such cases, are usually immune from
liability.137 Additionally, the statute of limitations for tort and
civil rights claims applies and some courts hold that time
begins running when the basis of the claim is discoverable, at
the time of the conviction rather than the time of exonera-
tion.138
When exonerees cannot prove the necessary elements
for a civil suit, they can lobby the legislature for a private com-
pensation bill.  For some exonerees, this option will not be pos-
sible because some states interpret their state constitutions as
forbidding private legislation.139 Even where private bills are
constitutional, exonerees need political connections in order for
this alternative to be viable.140 This route is fraught with uncer-
tainty and remains an arbitrary solution even when it is a pos-
sibility.  The case of Freddie Pitts and Wilbert Lee provides a
prime example of the problems inherent in the private bill
process.  Pitts and Lee, who served twelve years in prison for a
double murder they did not commit, each received $500,000
through a private bill passed by the Florida legislature.  The
Florida legislature approved their compensation in 1998, twen-
ty-three years after Pitts and Lee had been pardoned by the
governor.141  Newspaper accounts attributed the legislature’s
passage of the bill to Republican Florida House members’ need
to curry favor with African-American Democrats who support-
ed compensation.142 As an additional pitfall, governors have
occasionally vetoed private compensation bills out of concern
for the effect on the state budget.143
One problem common to both civil lawsuits and pri-
vate bills is the disparate results they produce in the treatment
of exonerees.  Of all the deserving exonerees, these processes
seem to randomly select a small number of them to receive sig-
nificant compensation while the rest receive nothing.  In
explaining his efforts to push a compensation statute through
the Ohio legislature, Ohio State University professor C. Ronald
Huff said, “most people got nothing because they couldn’t get
a special bill through.  Then somebody would get a million dol-
lars, which the state doesn’t like because they can’t budget for
it.”144
If exonerees are fortunate enough to live in a state
with a wrongful conviction compensation statute, they can
avoid the unpredictability of civil lawsuits and private legisla-
tion.  Twenty states, Washington D.C., and the federal govern-
ment currently have compensation statutes.145 As recently as
2002 only fourteen states, D.C., and the federal government
had such laws and they often provided woefully inadequate
compensation.146 Until 2004, 28 U.S.C. §2513, the federal
compensation statute, capped compensation at $5,000.147 New
Hampshire limits damages to $20,000.148 Similarly, Wisconsin
limits compensation to $5,000 per year served or a total of
$25,000.149 While other states have similarly low caps on com-
pensation, some, such as New York, West Virginia, Maryland,
and D.C., have no statutory limit.150 As a result of such dispar-
ities, the difference between an exoneree being eligible for
almost no compensation rather than unlimited compensation
depends solely on the accident of where he was convicted.  
Even states that provide sufficient compensation often
have overly stringent qualification requirements that prevent
deserving applicants from receiving an award.  Several states
require exonerees to be pardoned on the grounds of innocence
before they are eligible for compensation.151 Such a require-
ment transports the arbitrariness of the private bill process into
the statutory system by conditioning compensation on the will
of politicians.  Drawing from the tort concept of comparative
negligence, other states require that exonerees did not “con-
tribute” to their wrongful convictions.152 Under this condition,
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pleading guilty will disqualify an exoneree in Iowa, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and D.C.153 A false confession pre-
vents compensation in California, New Jersey, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and D.C.154 As a result, one of the most common
factors leading to wrongful convictions, a false confession,
serves as a disqualification from compensation.  
The most glaring oversight in nearly all compensation
statutes is the lack of access to social services.  Money alone
cannot eliminate the troubles that exonerees experience.  As
John Wilson, a psychologist who works with exonerees,
observed, “money is useful, it’s important, but it isn’t a solution
to the problems. . . It validates their exoneration. . . The money
helps replace what was lost – a career, a job, schooling, family
relations . . . So while it’s helpful to guarantee a safety net, it
really doesn’t solve any of the deeper psychological questions
that they have to face every day of their lives.”155
In order to fully compensate exonerees, statutes
should provide access to services such as job training and
placement, health care, education, and hous-
ing.156 Many of these benefits can easily be
provided through the same programs that serve
parolees.  The addition of the small number of
exonerees in any given state would not place an
excessive burden on providers of such servic-
es.157 Additionally, social services enable
exonerees to become productive members of
society after their release, lessening the likeli-
hood that states will end up supporting
exonerees on public assistance.  
Because of the difficulty of sustaining
a civil lawsuit, the arbitrariness and unpre-
dictability of private compensation bills, and the stringent eli-
gibility requirements in many compensation statutes, most
exonerees never receive any compensation for their ordeal and
those who do often wait years before they collect any money
and are not given access to necessary social services.  In order
to recognize society’s responsibility for their situation and to
facilitate their transition back into the community, states need
to pass comprehensive compensation legislation that ensures
that deserving applicants are quickly, justly, and fully compen-
sated.
Society’s Response to Exonerees’ Situation
While states have been slow to respond to the prob-
lems exonerees experience, social service organizations have
emerged to assist exonerees.  Immediately upon release, sup-
port from the public is usually what eases exonerees’ transi-
tion,158 but once the headlines disappear, the help from the pub-
lic trickles away as well.  Organizations, usually established by
lawyers and volunteers who assisted exonerees with their
cases, seek to sustain public awareness of the difficulties
exonerees must overcome.159 The Truth in Justice Foundation
provides assistance with housing, counseling, education, med-
ical care, and legal services to exonerees when they are
released.160 The National Police Defense Foundation has set
up a fund to pay the living expenses for Scott Hornoff, an ex-
police officer who was wrongly convicted of murder.161
The most comprehensive and widespread of these
organizations is the Life After Exoneration Program (LAEP),
jointly run by The Innocence Project and the DNA
Identification Technology and Human Rights Center of
Berkeley, California.162 LAEP works with medical, dental and
mental health care providers, social service providers, employ-
ers, and pro bono legal service providers in exonerees’ commu-
nities to assist them in finding housing, employment, psycho-
logical help, emergency financial assistance, and any necessary
legal assistance.163 LAEP has worked with between seventy-
five164 and 100165 exonerees and currently has a waitlist of
those needing services.166 LAEP relies primarily on individual
donations used to pay for medical exams, counseling sessions,
dental exams, clothing, computers, and small business grants or
loans.167 In addition to providing services to exonerees, LAEP
lobbies for comprehensive legislative reform, calling for
statutes including monetary compensation, access to social
services, job training, and expungement of exonerees’
records.168 LAEP recognizes that while its services ease
exonerees’ transition, there is a pressing need for a coordinated
response from states, in both the provision of
services and monetary compensation.169
Provide Adequate Compensation and Access
to Social Services 
In order to acknowledge society’s
obligation to exonerees, states should pass com-
prehensive compensation legislation that pro-
vides adequate monetary compensation and
access to social services.  Even states that currently have com-
pensation statutes need to reform their systems to remedy the
problems identified above, by eliminating unjustifiably low
limits on compensation, providing access to social services,
and relaxing the stringent eligibility requirements to ensure that
deserving applicants receive compensation.  By examining two
of the most recently enacted compensation statutes, those of
Massachusetts and Louisiana, it becomes clear that there is
movement in this direction, but there is progress yet to be
made.  
Recently, Louisiana responded to many of the con-
cerns about previous compensation laws.170 Under its statute,
applicants are eligible for compensation if their conviction has
been reversed or vacated and if factual innocence is proven by
clear and convincing evidence.  Monetary damages are limited
to $15,000 per year served or $150,000 total.  In addition to
monetary compensation, exonerees can receive job training for
one year, medical and counseling services for three years, and
tuition and fees at a public university for five years.  Although
Louisiana’s cap on damages is inadequate to fully compensa-
tion exonerees, its provision of non-monetary services can
serve as an example to states either revising their compensation
statutes or developing one for the first time.  
In passing its compensation statute171 Massachusetts
recognized the need to relax eligibility requirements, to provide
adequate compensation scales and caps, and to provide more
than simple monetary relief.  Applicants are eligible for com-
pensation if they prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
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they received a full pardon based on innocence or that (a) their
conviction was reversed or vacated, the indictment was dis-
missed, or a retrial resulted in an acquittal, (b) the result tend-
ed to establish the applicant’s innocence, and (c) there are no
pending charges stemming from the same set of facts underly-
ing the original conviction.172 These eligibility requirements
do not unjustifiably hinder meritorious claims, but, at the same
time, ensure that claims are based on actual innocence.
Because exonerees have already produced enough evidence of
actual innocence to obtain their release, the burden of proving
innocence by clear and convincing evidence is justified by the
state’s interest in not compensating guilty parties who had their
convictions reversed based on reliable, but legally inadmissible
evidence.  
The Massachusetts statute limits monetary damages to
$500,000.173 Damages are awarded based on the income the
exoneree would have earned if he had not been incarcerated,
the circumstances of the conviction, the length and condition of
incarceration, and other factors necessary to provide fair and
reasonable compensation.174 In addition to monetary compen-
sation, the court can order the provision of services to address
physical and emotional injuries caused by incarceration and
may award a fifty percent tuition reduction at state or commu-
nity colleges.175 The court may also expunge the applicant’s
record in a separate hearing.176 In light of these additional ben-
efits, the $500,000 cap is a reasonable limit on monetary com-
pensation.  
One provision of Massachusetts’ statute that is incon-
sistent with the need to ensure that deserving applicants are
compensated is the ineligibility of applicants who plead guilty
to the underlying crime.177 The rationale for such a require-
ment is that the state is less culpable for wrongful incarceration
that resulted from a guilty plea than from a conviction at trial.
By pleading guilty, the defendant somehow deprived the state
of the opportunity to correct its error.  However, given that the
vast majority of convictions result from guilty pleas, the num-
ber of exonerees in any one state will be small, and the statute
requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of actual inno-
cence, this rationale for excluding applicants who plead guilty
does not justify the failure to compensate potentially deserving
exonerees.  This is especially so because the impact of such a
provision will be felt disproportionately by poor, innocent
defendants as public defenders and appointed counsel do not
have the resources to take even a fraction of their cases to trial.
With the exception of this provision, Massachusetts’ compen-
sation statute effectively responds to the deficiencies of prior
compensation systems. 
Massachusetts and Louisiana’s statutes address many
of the shortcomings of other states’ statutes, but there are still
several provisions that should be included in order to fully
compensate exonerees.  First, statutes should differentiate
between economic and non-economic damages.  Economic
damages include lost wages, the legal expenses of defending
against the charges and fighting for release, and medical
expenses.  This category should not be subject to a cap; the bur-
den of proving such damages provides a natural limit.178
Non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering,
should be subject to a range of caps depending on the severity
of the crime and punishment involved.179 For example, some-
one wrongly convicted of a Class A felony who served fifteen
years could be eligible for $1 million, while someone convict-
ed of a Class B felony who served seven years would be eligi-
ble for only $500,000.  States could connect limits on non-eco-
nomic damages to the severity of the crime, the length of the
sentence, the length of time actually served, or some combina-
tion of these factors.180
Second, states should limit the scope of any “con-
tributed to conviction” provision.  Under many statutes,
exonerees who “contributed to their conviction” are not eligi-
ble for compensation.181 As noted earlier, in some states,
exonerees who plead guilty or who falsely confessed are ineli-
gible under such provisions.  The “contributed to conviction”
exception should only extend to deliberate efforts to interfere
with the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice sys-
tem.182 Exonerees who purposefully hindered police investiga-
tion or committed perjury would be ineligible for compensa-
tion.183 Otherwise, guilty pleas, false confessions, and expres-
sions of remorse at parole hearings would not disqualify appli-
cants if they can meet the requisite burden of proving actual
innocence.  
Statutes should also allow for awards of attorney’s
fees for successful applicants. As with any legal regime, appli-
cants need the assistance of counsel to navigate through the
system.  Providing for an award of attorneys’ fees ensures that
exonerees have representation adequate to take full advantage
of the system and that their monetary compensation is not
depleted by legal fees.184 Any award should be explicitly con-
ditioned on the attorney’s waiver of any claim to payment
directly from the exoneree.  
In providing non-monetary compensation, states
should ensure that any time limits imposed still allow
exonerees to reap the full benefit of the services.  For example,
Louisiana’s limit on access to medical and counseling services
to three years is probably insufficient to meet the needs of most
exonerees.  Judging by the experiences of exonerees, it will
take several years before they fully adjust to life outside of
prison, making counseling services especially important.  If
states impose time constraints on access to services, those lim-
its need to be tailored to the actual needs of exonerees.
Obviously, time limits will vary depending on the service.  For
example, one year is a reasonable limitation on access to job
training services, but not medical care.  
States will have to make several procedural decisions
as well.  The statutory scheme should provide a more stream-
lined process than ordinary civil litigation.  Given the immedi-
acy of exonerees’ needs, compensation should be forthcoming
as soon after an application is filed as practically possible.
However, the need for swift compensation must be weighed
against the state’s interest in ensuring its ability to adequately
screen claims.  Procedures should be constructed with both of
these considerations in mind.  All states ought to provide for
automatic expungement of an exoneree’s record upon award of
compensation.  Other than this requirement, states would have
latitude in establishing the procedures to be used for awarding
compensation.  
Exonerees should be able to pursue claims against
individuals for intentional misconduct.  Under almost all exist-
ing compensation statutes, an exoneree waives any claims
against the state when he accepts an award under the statutory
scheme.185 Because the exoneree is obtaining the benefit of a 
Spring 2007 10
more efficient path to compensation, this is a reasonable
demand.  However, exonerees should not be required to waive
any claims against individual government officials based on
their intentional misconduct.  Louisiana’s statute makes this
distinction, explicitly reserving claims arising from state
actors’ willful misconduct.186
Lastly, rather than awarding a lump sum designated
as compensation for future medical expenses, statutes should
provide exonerees with the same health insurance provided to
state employees.  Providing insurance rather than adding med-
ical expenses to the total compensation award has several
advantages.187 Most importantly, courts would not need to
guess at exonerees’ future medical expenses.  Providing insur-
ance will eliminate the risk that the court will over- or under-
estimate expenses, thereby over-compensating or under-com-
pensating the exoneree.  Also, the state can verify that the
money is actually used for medical expenses, assuring that
exonerees will not use the money for other purposes and
therefore be unable to seek necessary medical care in the
future.188 This method also saves the time and expense of
determining whether any particular ailment was caused by
incarceration.189 Any illness or injury within the state’s insur-
ance plan will be covered, regardless of whether it resulted
from incarceration.  States can also avoid placing arbitrary
time limits on access to medical care, as the Louisiana statute
has.  Finally, adding the few exonerees in any one state to the
state insurance plan adds little expense but provides an enor-
mous benefit to the exonerees.190 When compared to civil lit-
igation, private legislation, or existing statutes, a compensa-
tion statute that incorporates all or most of the above recom-
mendations will come much closer to quickly, fully, and justly
compensating the wrongly convicted.  
Beyond Compensation
In addition to disappointment with the lack of com-
pensation and access to social services, exonerees often expe-
rience frustration due to the failure of officials to acknowledge
the criminal justice system’s mistakes.191 Many exonerees
never receive even an informal apology from anyone from
within the justice system.192 The feeling of betrayal that results
is often exacerbated by the public’s, prosecutors’ or victims’
continued skepticism about their innocence.  In order to truly
compensate exonerees, society must acknowledge and address
the underlying causes of wrongful convictions.  
Like many who have suffered seemingly meaningless
suffering, exonerees feel a need to find some reason for their
wrongful convictions.193 They want to make sure something
positive comes from their ordeal.  Many give speeches and
attend conferences in order to educate the public about the risks
of wrongful convictions.194 Rather than simply seeking a pri-
vate compensation bill,195 others lobby their state legislatures
for comprehensive compensation legislation.196 Still others try
to convince police departments to reopen the investigations
into the crimes for which they were wrongly convicted or to
compare the DNA samples which proved their innocence to
existing DNA databases.  Nick Yarris, who spent twenty-three
years on Pennsylvania’s death row for murder and rape,
protested in an unsuccessful effort to get police to compare the
DNA sample that exonerated him to databases in order to find
the real murderer.197
Michael Green’s settlement with the city of Cleveland
provides a noteworthy example of how exonerees are inspired
by their wrongful conviction to affect change in the system.  In
a precedent-setting agreement with Cleveland, Green condi-
tioned his settlement on the city’s promise to reopen over a
hundred cases on which the forensics analyst involved in
Green’s case worked.198 In Green’s case, the forensics analyst
testified to findings that contradicted the findings in his lab
notes, which were not provided to defense counsel.  The city
agreed to review all cases since 1987 in which the analyst tes-
tified, all cases where the analyst performed tests and the
defendant then plead guilty, a random selection of the analyst’s
files, and a random selection of other analysts’ cases.  If any
mistakes are found, the city will notify the relevant defendant
and The Innocence Project.  Green was willing to accept less
money because Cleveland was willing to acknowledge the pos-
sibility that other mistakes had been made and to take the nec-
essary steps to rectify those mistakes.  
In order to make exonerees as whole as possible, soci-
ety must do more than provide monetary compensation and
access to services.  The various actors within the criminal jus-
tice system must publicly acknowledge that mistakes were
made.  Moving away from civil litigation as a path to compen-
sation will allow prosecutors and police to more easily admit to
their errors.  When confronted with a civil suit against the state,
the city, or themselves individually, prosecutors and police are
put on the defensive.  Against the background of a non-fault
based compensation system, they will be better able to cooper-
ate with exonerees in efforts to find solutions to the underlying
problems in the criminal justice system.  
As increasing numbers of people have been exonerat-
ed since the 1990s, it has become clear that simply releasing
the wrongly convicted does not adequately remedy the injury
inflicted on them.  Much like parolees, exonerees confront
overwhelming obstacles after their release.  They struggle to
find housing and adequate employment.  They must adjust to
the tremendous changes in their communities and their families
and must cope with the psychological damage caused by incar-
ceration.  
However, exonerees are not provided with the servic-
es provided to parolees that assist them in their transition back
into society.  Unless they receive some sort of compensation,
exonerees must fend for themselves.  However, the paths to and
adequacy of compensation depend greatly on where an
exoneree was convicted.  In the thirty states that do not current-
ly have compensation statutes, exonerees must traverse the
uncertain path of either civil litigation or private legislation.
Even including the states with statutes, most exonerees never
receive any compensation.
Most compensation statutes currently in effect have
several problems.  Damages scales are often inadequate to fully
compensate exonerees.  Stringent eligibility requirements often
prevent deserving applicants from qualifying for compensation
and very few statutes provide access to social services such as
job training, health care, or housing assistance.  States must
design statutory schemes to address these problems, by limit-
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ing only non-economic damages, developing eligibility stan-
dards that ensure deserving exonerees are compensated, and
providing sufficiently long-term access to job training, educa-
tion assistance, medical and counseling services, and housing
assistance.  
In addition to developing such comprehensive com-
pensation legislation, states must address the underlying caus-
es of wrongful convictions.  Exonerees will not feel whole if
they believe that the factors that led to their convictions have
not been adequately remedied.  As well as implementing
reforms to reduce the risk of wrongful convictions,199 states
should reopen cases that resulted in wrongful convictions in an
effort to identify the real criminal, regardless of whether an
eventual prosecution would be possible.200 When the willful
misconduct of a police officer, prosecutor, or forensics analyst
led to a wrongful conviction, states should review other cases
in which the relevant individual was involved.  
Only when the criminal justice system adequately
addresses the causes of wrongful convictions and provides
exonerees with comprehensive compensation can society begin
to pay its debt to the wrongly convicted.  The fact that it is
impossible to fully compensate an individual for the loss of
years of his freedom does not absolve society of its duty to rec-
tify the injustice inflicted on exonerees to the extent feasible.
Currently, society is simply failing in that duty.   
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Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations*
- There have been 195 post-conviction DNA exonerations in
the United States to date. 
- The first DNA exoneration took place in 1989. Exonerations
have been won in 31 states since then; in 2006, there were 18
exonerations. 
- 14 DNA exonerees were at one time sentenced to death or
served time on death row. 
- The average length of time served by those exonerated by
DNA testing is 12 years. 
- The true suspects and/or perpetrators have been identified in
more than a third of the DNA exoneration cases. 
- Since 1989, there have been tens of thousands of cases where
prime suspects were arrested or indicted – until DNA testing
(prior to trial) proved that they were wrongly accused. 
- In more than 25% of cases in a National Institute of Justice
study, suspects were excluded once DNA testing was conduct-
ed during the criminal investigation (the study, conducted in
1995, included 10,060 cases where testing was performed by
FBI labs). 
- 21 states, the federal government and the District of Columbia
have passed laws to compensate people who have been exoner-
ated. Awards under these statutes vary greatly.
*  http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php# 
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